Have you ever been frustrated with your country's foreign policy? Since the creation of the modern nation-state system four centuries ago, the formulation and execution of foreign policy has been the province solely of each nation-state's national government. A citizen of a western democracy displeased with his country's foreign policy can either petition his government to change its ways, or attempt to replace the government at elections with a new one. Other countries might change their governments and their foreign policies through the barrel of a gun. Private entities such as corporations, trade associations, and interest groups attempt to influence the foreign policies of governments around the world. But foreign policy in the modern era has always been a matter of state, never a private venture directly implemented.

This state of affairs may now be changing. The long era of the nation-states' monopoly on foreign policy may coming to an end.

Stateless Militaries, Stateless Actors

Recently at TCS Daily, contributing writer Josh Manchester explored the subject of stateless armies. In Al Qaeda for the Good Guys: The Road to Anti-Qaeda, Mr. Manchester examined the growing variety and effect of stateless military organizations as varied as Al Qaeda, Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia in Iraq, and Blackwater, a large private security company based in North Carolina. Mr. Manchester then described how nation-states might find such "off the books" organizations useful.

In a follow-up article titled Realizing Anti-Qaeda, Mr. Manchester wondered whether stopping Al Qaeda would require an organization similar to Al Qaeda -- a stateless, borderless, decentralized network operating without geographic, bureaucratic, or even legal constrains. Such an organization could be completely untethered from state control, being both self-financed and self-directed. Mr. Manchester questioned whether modern Western nation-states could, within the constraints they place on their actions, be as effective as they need to be in order to defeat a stateless network such as Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda has shown how a stateless actor can formulate and implement its own foreign policy and by doing so dramatically upset the previous international order. Osama bin Laden and his followers had their grievances about the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Bin Laden could not change the foreign policies of these nation-states to his liking so he implemented his own. We should not be surprised to see other actors, at every point on the political spectrum, begin to see direct private action as the best way to achieve their own foreign policy goals.

Frustrations with the Modern Nation-State

All manner of interest groups can find frustration with the limitations and compromises inherent in the functioning of the modern nation-state. Environmentalists will conclude that many governments are doing too little to protect certain parcels of critical wildlife habitat. Interest groups concerned about public health in the developing world may conclude that less corruption, better governance, and better local security are needed in many situations to make further progress. Human rights activists may be appalled that the world seems to ignore gross human rights abuses in Sudan, Congo, the Balkans, China, North Korea, and elsewhere. Other private individuals or groups may be frustrated that the U.S. government seems to be permitting Al Qaeda to maintain a sanctuary in northwest Pakistan, or is otherwise pursuing the War on Terror with what they perceive to be too little vigor. The list of perceived foreign policy shortcomings, from every point on the political spectrum, is endless.

In each of these cases, solving the problem to the satisfaction of the activists in question will ultimately require the threat or the actual use of force. Current political theory informs us that legitimately constituted governments should have a monopoly on the exercise of force. In the view of the activists, nation-states should use their monopoly power over force to solve these problems. The activists lobby and cajole their governments to do so. But governments, bound by the limitations of law, resources, political compromise, and diplomacy, will usually disappoint the activists.

If an activist believes the stakes are high enough and the prospect of effective legitimate government action too remote, could the activist do something directly? Can he do something to protect that patch of rain forest from loggers, or protect that ethnic group in Sudan from marauders, or ensure effective distribution of medicines and clean water in Africa, or do any number of other tasks that require the protection of men with guns? Can an activist implement his own private foreign policy?

What Does an Army Cost?

Military expeditions are expensive. Salaries for trained men are only the beginning. Soldiers need food, water, ammunition, weapons, mountains of expensive equipment, and a variety of other consumables. They need transportation: specialized vehicles, cargo aircraft, and helicopters.

How much does this cost? In this memo written last summer by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, budget analysts estimated the extra operations, maintenance, and procurement costs of maintaining a 40,000 man U.S. force in Iraq in 2011 would total $20 billion per year (see page 20 of the memo). That is $500,000 per soldier per year, or about $1,400 per soldier per day. Using this same daily cost estimate for a hypothetical private military expedition and adding in a hired mercenary's salary of $600 per day gives a round figure of $2,000 per man per day. $2,000 per man per day is a rough guess of what a private activist would have to spend on his own military expedition.

There is obviously much room for discussion about this estimate. The CBO estimate is for how the U.S. military would fight in Iraq in 2011: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, fleets of helicopters, tactical aircraft, and generous logistical support. A light infantry mercenary force would be much more austere. On the other hand, the U.S. government enjoys both economies of scale and quantity discounts on consumables a private venture might not get. But with a budget of $2,000 per man per day, a private venture force, like the U.S. Army, would hopefully be able to afford modern communications equipment and optics, tactical vehicles, cargo aircraft, and attack and transport helicopters. As described in P.W. Singer's book "Corporate Warriors," Executive Outcomes, a now-defunct private security contractor, employed this list of equipment during its famous venture in Sierra Leone in 1995.

Putting these tools in the hands of trained and experienced men can yield an impressive capability. The West now has an abundance of highly-trained and experienced combat veterans. Over a million Americans have served in Iraq or Afghanistan, many several times. There are now thousands of special operations qualified combat veterans from the U.S., Great Britain, Poland, Germany, France, Denmark, and elsewhere. And then there are the contractors, such as those from Blackwater, deepening the pool of experience.

Who Can Afford His Own Army?

Still, $2,000 per man per day adds up quickly. A 500-man mercenary force composed of 350 shooters and 150 aviation and other support personnel would run $1 million per day, or $365 million per year. What private activist could afford such an expense?

Quite a few. A glance at the bottom of the Forbes 400 list of richest people in the world finds numerous people with a net worth of $2 billion. Assuming a modest investment return of 5% per annum, such a person could employ the 500-man air and ground-mobile mercenary force described above for over three months, spending only his annual investment earnings and without ever touching his investment principal.

This list of the 50 largest private foundations in the United States shows a similar finding. Number 50 on this list has the financial capacity to employ, using only the foundation's annual investment income, the 500-man force for almost two months. On the other end of the spectrum, the $60 billion Bill Gates/Warren Buffett foundation could, in theory, employ a 4,100-man air and ground-mobile brigade for a year, using only the foundation's annual investment income. Such a brigade of former special forces men would have the capability of removing just about any government in Africa, many in Asia, and more than a few in Latin America. When Mr. and Mrs. Gates and Mr. Buffett seethe with frustration over the corruption, incompetence, and tribalism that interfere with their public health efforts in Africa, one wonders whether the thought of more direct measures ever enters their minds.

The Twilight of the Nation-State?

In his recent speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Philip C. Bobbitt, a constitutional law professor and former U.S. National Security Council staffer, described how the traditional nation-state structure of the world is giving way to the "market-state," the self-organizing global networks and associations that now make the world function. Not all "market-states" are virtuous. Mr. Bobbitt describes how Al Qaeda will be the first in a long line of "market-state terrorists."

And so it should be no surprise if others actors and activists, including those with the most noble and humane of intentions, adopt the "market-state" model to achieve the outcomes they seek after becoming exasperated with what they will conclude is the unsatisfactory performance of the traditional nation-state.

I am not predicting that Mr. Gates, Mr. Buffett, or any other particular individual or foundation in the lists cited above is about to turn "rogue" and begin organizing military expeditions employing mercenaries. What I am showing is that the trained military manpower, the equipment, and the financial capacity exist to organize these ventures.

What remains to simmer is the idealism of noble intentions, frustration with the shortcomings of nation-states, and the urgency and will for someone, somewhere to act on his beliefs. All of the other tools are there for a wealthy activist, of which there are many, to implement his own private foreign policy.

The author was a U.S. Marine Corps infantry company commander and staff officer. He was the global research director for a large private investment firm and is now a private investor. His blog is Westhawk.